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ABSTRACT
Natural and agricultural resources for which there is a substantial black market, such as coca, opium,
and diamonds, appear especially likely to be exploited by the parties to a civil conflict. On the other
hand, these resources may also provide one of the few reliable sources of income in the countryside.
In this paper, we study the economic and social consequences of a major shift in the production of
coca paste from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, where most coca leaf is now harvested. This shift,
which arose in response to the disruption of the "air bridge" that previously ferried coca paste into
Colombia, provided an exogenous boost in the demand for Colombian coca leaf. Our analysis shows
this shift generated economic gains in rural areas, primarily in the form of increased self-employment
earnings and increased labor supply by teenage boys. There is little evidence of widespread economic
spillovers, however. The results also suggest that the rural areas which saw accelerated coca
production subsequently became much more violent. Taken together, these findings support the view
that the Colombian civil conflict is fueled by the financial opportunities that coca provides. This is
in line with a recent literature which attributes the extension of civil conflicts to economic rewards


















“If it weren’t for the armed groups, I think we could reach a consensus on what the region needs to 
progress. But all the armed groups want is to control the economic question, and all are willing to 
massacre or murder or force people from their homes to win. 
 
  -- Gloria Cuartas, major of Apartadó (quoted in Kirk, 2003). 
 
I. Introduction 
The consequences of changing regional economic conditions are of longstanding economic and 
policy interest. American examples include the fate of regions with declining industries such as coal 
(Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002; Black, McKinnish and Sanders, 2005) and, in the other direction, the 
Alaskan pipeline boom (Carrington, 1996).  But nowhere is the interest in regional economic conditions 
more acute than in war-torn nations or regions embroiled in civil conflict.  Perhaps not coincidentally, 
many such areas appear to have local economies that depend to a large extent on natural resources, 
especially those related to illegal economic activities or for which there is a black market.  Examples 
include the drug trade in Latin America and Afghanistan and so-called blood diamonds in Africa.  The 
regional concentration of these activities raises the question of whether economic activity in conflict 
zones sustains or dampens conflict.  One possibility is that increasing income reduces poverty, thereby 
moderating combatants’ desire to fight.  But increases in the value of easily exploited economic resources 
may also contribute to instability and violence.   
The idea that resource wealth can be bad for development is sometimes known as the “resource 
curse” (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2000).  Economic analyses of the resource curse typically focus on the 
possibilities of an export-induced Dutch disease and effects on government corruption or rent seeking 
(e.g., Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Hausmann and Rigobon, 2003).  The effect of natural 
resources on the incidence and duration of civil wars provides a less-explored channel by which natural 
resources may have perverse effects.  This channel features in a burgeoning political science literature, 
which includes empirical contributions by Collier, Hoeffler and Sodbom (2004), Fearon (2004), and Ross 
(2003). An antecedent in economics is the theoretical analysis by Grossman (1991).  There is some 
circumstantial evidence that illegal resources such as drugs increase the duration of civil conflicts (Ross,  
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2004), but economists and political scientists have yet to produce evidence on this question from a 
compelling natural experiment. 
In this paper we use a quasi-experimental research design to study the impact of demand shocks 
for illicit resources on rural economic conditions and civil conflict.  The setting for our study is 
Colombia, an excellent laboratory in this case since almost all of the cocaine consumed in North America 
and Europe comes from the Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru (United Nations, 2001). 
Moreover, we exploit a sharp change in the structure of the Andean drug industry: before 1994, most of 
the cocaine exported from Colombia was refined from coca leaf grown in Bolivia and Peru.  Beginning in 
1994, however, in response to increasingly effective air interdiction by American and local militaries, the 
so-called air bridge that ferried coca paste from growers to Colombian refiners was disrupted.  In 
response, coca cultivation and paste production shifted to Colombia’s countryside, where it eventually 
surpassed pre-interdiction levels as Colombian growers became more productive.  We use this shift to 
assess the consequences of the coca economy for Colombia’s rural population.  
The first question considered here is whether increased demand for coca affected economic 
conditions for the rural population in ways we can measure using survey data.  In particular, the end of 
the air bridge provides a mirror which can be used to look at the claim that drug interdiction has 
substantial economic costs for rural producers (see, e.g., Leons, 1997, and Chauvin, 1999).  If interdiction 
is costly, then the post-air-bridge Colombian coca boom of the early 1990s should have had substantial 
economic benefits.  We therefore look at effects on earnings, labor supply, and income, as well as child 
labor and school enrollment.  Of course, coca cultivation per se may do little to enrich the cultivators, 
since – as with the relationship between the farmgate price of coffee and the beans we buy at Starbucks – 
the price of raw coca leaf makes up a small fraction of the price of cocaine (Alvarez, 1995).  On the other 
hand, most estimates suggest cocaine plays a large enough role in the Colombian economy for changes in 
the demand for coca to have a perceptible economic effect.
1 
                                                 
1 For example, Steiner (1998) estimates total Colombian income from illegal drugs at 4-6 percent of GDP in the first 
half of the 1990s.   See also Thoumi (2002).     
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The widely observed association between illicit crops and civil strife raises the related question of 
whether increased coca cultivation has an impact on violence.  The link with violence is especially 
relevant in Colombia, which has experienced some of the highest homicide rates in the world in spite of 
substantial economic growth through most of the 20
th Century and Colombia’s status as one of the oldest 
democracies in Latin America.  The effect of the drug trade on violence has been widely debated in 
Colombian policy circles (see, e.g., Cardenas, 2001).  While a link at first seems obvious, it bears 
emphasizing that the historical record is ambiguous.  Marijuana became an important crop only in the 
1960s and the cocaine trade began in the 1970s, with significant coca plantings appearing only in the 
1990s (see, e.g., Bagley, 1998).  Yet violence and civil conflict, especially outside the major cities, have 
been a major factor in Colombian political life since independence.  During ‘La Violencia’ (1948-57), for 
example, as many as 200,000 Colombians were killed (Winn, 1999).   Clearly, cocaine cannot be blamed 
for starting this conflict, though it may have a role in perpetuating it. 
Weighing in favor of a link between the Colombian drug trade and violence is the fact that some 
of the more recent violence is the work of drug cartels or individuals operating on their behalf.  Thus, 
homicide rates peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the cartel leadership rebelled against 
extradition efforts.  Probably more importantly, the major Colombian Guerilla groups, especially the 
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), are widely 
believed to derive substantial income by taxing drug proceeds, as do illegal self-defense groups or 
paramilitaries (Rangel, 2000; Rabasa and Chalk, 2001; Villalon, 2004). 
Although our focus is on a Colombian case study, the links between economic activity and 
violence are of long-standing interest to economists.  On one hand, our study provides additional 
evidence in the spirit of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), who link exogenous changes in 
economic conditions (generated by rainfall) to civil conflict in Africa.  As noted above, our work is also 
related to a growing political economy literature on the forces that generate civil conflict.  Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) argue that modern civil wars are sustained in large part by economic forces such as easy 
financing for rebel groups and the opportunity to extract rents from economic activity.  Fearon and Laitin  
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(2003) similarly focus on the “pull” of opportunity as opposed to the “push” of grievances in generating 
and sustaining conflict.
2 
Two broad features of our findings support the new opportunistic view.  First, in contrast with the 
Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2005) study of coal-mining regions in the US, we find no evidence that coca 
substantially benefits an entire growing region.  While coca cultivation is associated with increased self-
employment income for those already active in this sector, it does not raise employment or overall 
earnings.  This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the economic benefits of coca growing are 
largely taxed away by combatants or otherwise dissipated through non-productive activities.  Second, in 
spite of the fact that coca appears to increase income and hours worked for some groups, violence 
increased sharply in the coca-growing regions when growing increased.  This is consistent with the view 
that coca fuels Colombia’s seemingly interminable civil conflict.
3 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides additional background and shows 
why a cross-country analysis of the impact of coca growing in Latin America is unsatisfactory.  Section 
III outlines the approach we used to divide Colombia into coca-growing and non-growing regions for the 
purposes of our within-country survey-based analysis.  Section IV discusses estimates of the effect of 
coca growing on rural economic conditions and Section V presents the mortality estimates. Section VI 
summarizes and interprets the results. 
 
II. Institutional Background and Economic Framework 
Coca is grown in thousands of small peasant holdings, initially mostly in Bolivia and Peru.
4 
Harvested coca leaves are dried by farmers and sold to entrepreneurs who make them into coca paste, a 
simple chemical process that takes a few days.  Paste has about one-hundredth the volume of coca leaves, 
and the transition from leaf to paste is where most of the weight reduction in cocaine production occurs.  
                                                 
2 A related literature contrasts opportunism and poverty as causes of terrorism; see, e.g., Krueger and Maleckova, 
2003; Abadie, 2004.    
3 Diaz and Sanchez (2004) offer a recent exploration of the coca-conflict nexus in Colombia, arguing that conflict 
causes coca and not vice versa, but their spatial-correlations research design does not exploit exogenous shifts.     
4 This section draws on Whynes (1992) and Thoumi (1995).  
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The next step in coca processing is to make coca base, a somewhat more complicated chemical process.  
Finally, cocaine hydrochloride is refined from coca base, a chemical process that often occurs in towns or 
cities.  Street cocaine is made by diluting cocaine hydrochloride with sugar and baking soda, usually in 
the consuming country. 
While Colombia has almost always been the principal exporter of refined cocaine, until fairly 
recently little coca was grown there.  Colombian middlemen and exporters operated by importing coca 
paste (or coca base) from Bolivia and Peru, specializing in refining and distributing cocaine 
hydrochloride (i.e., cocaine).  In the early 1990s, the drug industry changed in response to a change in 
emphasis in US and producer-country enforcement policies.  In April 1992, after Peruvian president 
Fujimori’s so-called self-coup, the Peruvian military began aggressively targeting jungle airstrips and 
small planes suspected of carrying coca paste, as part of a general process of militarization of the drug 
war (Zirnite, 1998).  Colombia followed suit in 1994 with a similar shoot-down policy for planes ferrying 
paste from both Peru and Bolivia.  US policy moved in tandem with Presidential Decision Directive 14 in 
November 1993, which shifted U.S. interdiction away from Caribbean transit zones like Bermuda 
towards an attempt to stop cocaine production in the Andes.  The disruption of the air bridge ferrying 
coca paste into Colombia was a key part of this effort.
5 
The militarization of the drug war and disruption of the air bridge does not appear to have 
reduced the supply of cocaine (see, e.g., Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).  It did, however, lead to a marked shift 
in the organization of the industry among producer countries.  This can be seen in Figure 1, which uses 
data from a United Nations (2001) drug report to show the change in the locus of production of dry coca 
leave from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia.  While Bolivian production was flat in the early 1990s, 
Peruvian production fell sharply from 1992 to 1993, followed by a sharp increase in Colombia of about 
50 percent from 1993 to 1994. Part of this increase appears to have come from increased cultivation and 
                                                 
5 The Peruvian and Colombian shoot-down policies can be seen as a response to U.S. pressure. Militarization of the 
drug war began as part of first President Bush’s “Andean Strategy” in 1990, with a program of military, economic, 
and law-enforcement assistance for Andean nations in FY1990-94.  Initially, however, this effort met with little 
sympathy in the region (Washington Office on Latin America, 1991).  Late 1992 and 1993 marked the beginning of 
a period of independent efforts and sharply increased cooperation by producer nations.  
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part from improved yields.  Colombian production continued to grow thereafter, as did the Colombian 
share of total production.  Other figures in the United Nations (2001) report show that by 1997, potential 
coca production in Colombia (i.e., before crop eradication following Plan Colombia in 2001) exceeded 
that in Peru. 
 
Economic framework 
We see the end of the air bridge as initiating an exogenous fall in the price of coca (leaf, paste, or 
base) in the traditional producer nations of Bolivia and Peru, while causing a price increase in Colombia.  
The price in traditional growing countries fell when coca could no longer be shipped to Colombian 
refineries and distributors.  Peruvian and Bolivian growers have no competitive export channels of their 
own since they have no Caribbean ports and because their foreign distribution networks are not well-
developed.  At the same time, the price of coca grown in Colombia increased when drug middlemen and 
entrepreneurs tried to elicit new and more accessible supplies.  Farmers and potential farmers responded 
to the increase in the price of coca by growing more of it, a response that very likely accounts for the 
pattern in Figure 1, though non-economic factors may have been at work as well.   
  Did the end of the air bridge really change coca prices in the manner described above?  Although 
we do not have a reliable time series of coca prices by producer country, anecdotal evidence supports this 
description of the coca market in the mid-1990s.  For example, Zirnite (1998, p. 171) quotes the regional 
US military commander testifying to Congress in 1996 that, “the so-called air bridge between Peru and 
Colombia saw a greater than 50% temporary reduction of flights,” and that consequently, “. . . there was a 
glut of coca base on the market and the price of the product being shipped fell 50 percent overall and by 
as much as 80 percent in some areas.”  On the Colombian side, data reported in Uribe (1997, p. 62) for 
the department of  Guaviare show the price of base more than doubled from 1992-94.  Journalistic 
accounts similarly point to an increase in prices in Colombia (e.g., Villalon, 2004).
6 
                                                 
6 A related question is why coca was not previously grown in large quantities in Colombia.  The answer appears to 
be that Colombian coca farms were less productive; see p. 71 in Uribe (1997).  Consistent with the increase in coca  
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  This framework suggests a number of channels through which increased coca cultivation might 
affect economic conditions and the level of rural violence in coca-growing regions.  The increase in coca 
prices presumably made coca farmers better off, with possible regional spillovers of the sort documented 
by Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (2005) in the Appalachian coal-mining region and by Carrington 
(1996) in Alaska.  Spillovers may arise here because of linkages to other sectors or due to increased 
demand as a result of income effects.  At the same time, increased prices and production generated new 
sources of revenue for taxation.  Because the central government is weak in the Colombian countryside, 
these opportunities most likely benefited guerillas and paramilitaries.  Of course, if coca taxes are too 
high, then there is no incentive to produce.  Taxes were imposed not only at the point of sale, however, 
but also through kidnapping, extortion, and based on the guerilla’s “economic census”, a sort of partisan’s 
tax return (Rangel, 2002, p. 588).
7  This tax and extortion system may transfer a large fraction of the 
economic benefits of coca production to combatants, while still leaving coca production more attractive 
than alternative activities.  In addition, to the extent that coca finances a disruptive civil conflict, 
increased coca production may have reduced the overall level of economic activity in war-torn regions. 
 
Cross-country Comparisons 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the social and economic consequences – for Colombians – 
of the shift in coca cultivation and the production of coca leaf and paste to Colombia.  A natural starting 
point for this sort of analysis is a cross-country comparison.  We begin with a picture of GDP growth in 
the Andes and neighboring countries, shown in Figure 2a.  In the early 1990s, Colombian growth rates 
began falling, eventually becoming negative.  Peruvian GDP growth fell even more steeply, after a sharp 
up-tick in 1993.  The figure also shows, however, that many Latin American countries were in recession 
                                                                                                                                                             
production, the production of Colombian coffee, which like coca is grown mainly in small plots, turned sharply 
downwards in the mid-late 1990s, after increasing over most of the previous two decades (see 
http://www.dane.gov.co/inf_est/ena.html).  
7 About 85% and 65% of the FARC’s and ELN’s revenues, respectively, are estimated to come from drugs and 
extortion (Rangel, 2002, p. 585).  While similar estimates of revenue sources do not exist, paramilitary groups are 
also widely believed to benefit from the drug trade.  Grossman and Mejia (2004) develop a theoretical model of 
guerilla involvement in drug production.    
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to one degree or another for much of the 1990s.  By contrast, Bolivia’s GDP was mainly constant 
throughout the 1990s.  The fact that GDP growth declined more steeply in Peru than in Colombia may be 
due in part to the shift of coca production to Colombia.  Nevertheless, the figure also suggests the 
presence of strong country-specific trends that may dominate these effects.   
Paralleling our interest in violence and civil conflict, Figure 2b plots homicide rates by country in 
Latin America for 1990-2001 or years where data are available.  In contrast with a pattern of generally 
increasing homicide in the 1980s, (see, e.g., Gaviria, 2000), the Colombian homicide picture was largely 
improving in the 1990s.  While rates also fell in Bolivia (over the brief period for which we have data) 
and over a longer period in Peru, homicide in Colombia began to decline in 1992, and fell steeply after 
1993, when coca production was skyrocketing.  At the same time, the homicide picture in other 
comparison countries, such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela was stable or deteriorating.  Again, the 
cross-country differences in trend are difficult to interpret; the early 1990s saw extraordinary violence as 
Colombian drug lords fought amongst each other and with the government, mainly in urban areas and 
largely in reaction to US pressure for extradition.  The death of Pablo Escobar in December 1993 marked 
the end of what was an unusually violent period, even by Colombian standards.  The strong country-
specific trends in violence suggest that here too a within-country analysis, distinguishing urban and rural 
violence, is likely to be more fruitful. 
 
 
III. Classification of Regions 
Our research design exploits the fact that the change in the drug industry in the early 1990s 
probably had a disproportionate effect on Colombian departments which, by virtue of climate and soil 
conditions, politics, or infrastructure were hospitable to the cultivation of coca plants and the production 
of coca paste.  This naturally raises the question of how to classify departments or regions as potential 
coca-growers and paste-producers.  The best candidates for future coca production seem likely to be 
departments with a pre-existing coca presence.  We identified baseline coca-growing departments using 
estimates for 1994 reported in Uribe (1997, p. 67).  This source collects a number of international  
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observers’ estimates of hectares of coca bush under cultivation in Colombian departments.  The reports 
summarized in the table are dated October 1994, so the data were presumably collected somewhat earlier.  
The 9 departments that had at least 1,000 hectares under cultivation are Bolivar, Caqueta, Cauca, Meta, 
Narino, Putumayo, Guaviare, Vaupes, and Vichada.
8 
In a second coding scheme, we expanded the definition of the growing region to include the five 
additional departments identified as growing on a satellite map in Perafan (1999, p. 11).  This map is also 
dated 1994.  The Perafan map adds the three Northern departments of Cesar, Magdalena, and La Guajira, 
and the departments of Norte de Santander and Guainia.  These 5 are also listed as growing regions in 
Uribe (1997), while all in the group of 9 appear as growing on Perafan’s (1999) map.   We refer to the 
expanded coding scheme as defining a “14-department growing region” and the 5 additional departments 
added to the 9 growing departments to construct this region as “medium producers”. 
Our color-coded map, reproduced in the Appendix, shows the 9 department growing region to be 
concentrated in the Southern and Eastern part of the country.  Note, however, that not all Southern or 
Eastern departments grow large amounts of coca.  For example, Amazonas, in the Southeast corner, and 
Arauca, in the East, are not coded as a growing department in either scheme.  The group of 9 growing 
departments includes two, Meta and Caqueta, which were ceded to FARC control from 1998 to 2001 as 
part of an abortive peace effort.  We refer to these two as the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and allow for 
separate DMZ effects in the empirical work.  The five departments coded as medium producers are 
mostly in the Northern part of the country, though one, Guainia, is in the far Eastern region.   
To establish a “first-stage” relation for our division of Colombian departments into growing and 
non-growing regions, we regressed the growth in coca cultivation from 1994 to 1999 or 1994 to 2000 on 
an indicator for growing status in 1994.  Growth is measured from a 1994 base since this is the year used 
to classify growing regions (as noted earlier, the 1994 data were probably collected earlier).  The 
endpoint years of 1999 and 2000 are used because these are the years for which departmental cultivation 
                                                 
8 Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (2002) similarly identify counties affected by the coal boom and bust using pre-
existing production data.  
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figures are available. In any case, the change from 1994 to the end of the decade seems likely to provide a 
good summary of coca penetration in the relevant period.
9 
The first-stage results, summarized in Table 1, show a strong correlation between coca growth 
and base-period growing status.
10  The estimates in Column (1), Panel A indicate that cultivation grew by 
about 8,000 more hectares in the 9-department growing region than elsewhere, while the omission of 
medium producers leads to a slightly larger effect.  Omission of the two DMZ departments leads to an 
even larger effect of almost 9,000 hectares, shown in column 2 of Panel B.  With or without DMZ 
departments, the growth effect is significantly different from zero. The estimates in Columns (5)-(8) also 
show mostly larger effects when growth is measured through 2000 instead of 1999, with growing regions 
gaining 8,961 (s.e.=4,358) hectares over the period in the sample without medium producers.
11  None of 
the intercept estimates are significantly different from zero, indicating essentially no growth in the 
departments with no initial production in 1994.  Finally, estimates with growing status defined using the 
14-department scheme, i.e., moving the medium producers to the treated group, also show substantial 
growth in cultivation, but less than in the 9-department subset omitting medium producers.  The 14-
department scheme also generates a smaller intercept. 
An interesting finding in this context, relevant for our choice of estimation strategy, is that 
dummies for the two growing regions do a better job of predicting coca growth than a linear predictor 
using base-period levels.  Results from the linear parameterization can be seen in the last two rows of 
each panel of Table 1.  A visual representation of alternate parameterizations is presented in Figure 3, 
                                                 
9 The 1999-2000 data are from Colombia’s anti-drug agency, Direccion National de Estupefacientes (DNE, 2002), 
collected through the Illicit Crop Monitoring System (SIMCI- Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilicitos).  
This system was implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime with the logistical support of the 
Colombian anti-narcotics Police (DIRAN) and in coordination with the DNE.  The data are from satellite images 
and verification flights.  Data for 2000 appear to be more complete than the 1999 data.  
10 Our use of the term “first-stage” in this context is motivated by the fact that, given consistent departmental time 
series data on coca production, we could use interactions between initial growing conditions and a post-air-bridge 
dummy as an instrumental variable for the effects of endogenous coca production on economic conditions and 
violence.  In the absence of reliable data on the relevant endogenous variable, we focus below on the reduced form 
regressions of economic and mortality outcomes on initial conditions/time interactions. 
11 Mean growth is about 2,800 hectares through 1999 and 2,900 through 2000.  The 1994 mean for hectares under 
cultivation is about 2,100.  In the 9-department growing region, the base mean was 7,155 and the in 14-department 
growing region, the base mean was 4,732.  
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which plots coca growth against base period levels, using different symbols for the non-growing region, 
the 9-department growing region, and the remaining growing region on a log scale. The two growing 
regions have much higher coca growth, but the relationship between base period levels and growth rates 
is not especially linear.   Although the best single predictor of coca growth is a dummy for the 9-
department region, the empirical work below focuses mainly on the 14-region scheme since this turns out 
to balance pre-treatment homicide rates better than the 9-department scheme and because the rural 
household survey is missing some growing departments.
12 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Region Type 
  Not surprisingly, the growing departments are more rural than the rest of the country.  This is 
apparent in the descriptive statistics in Table 2, which compares growing and non-growing regions along 
a number of dimensions.  The comparison between growing and non-growing is affected by the fact that 
the non-growing region includes the three departments with Colombia’s largest cities: the Bogota capital 
district; Antioquia, which contains Medellin, an especially violent city; and Valle del Cauca, where Cali is 
located.  To improve comparability with growing regions when comparing homicide rates, we tabulated 
statistics without these 3 departments.  We also drop the Bogota capital district, Antioquia and Valle del 
Cauca from the mortality analyses in order to avoid confounding the effects of coca production with the 
secular decline in violence in big cities in the early nineties.  Only the Bogota capital district is dropped 
from the analysis of rural labor markets and rural income. 
Omitting the 3 big-city departments, the non-growing population is 65 percent urban, in 
comparison to 50 percent urban in the 9 department region minus the DMZ, 58 percent in the DMZ, and 
66 percent urban in the 5 additional growing departments (medium producers).  Although growing and 
non-growing departments differ along the urban/rural dimension, they had similar primary school 
                                                 
12 We also attempted to define growing regions based on climate and soil conditions using geographic information 
from Torres and Mendez (2000).  In practice, this did not lead to as strong a first stage for coca growth as a 
classification schemes based on 1994 levels, probably because coca appears to be a hardy plant that grows under a 
fairly broad range of conditions (Thoumi, 2002, p.105).    
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enrollment rates. Secondary school enrollment was somewhat lower in the growing regions, consistent 
with the fact that these regions are more rural. 
The early 1990s homicide rates shown in the table were unusually high, even by Colombian 
standards. For example, the homicide rate reached a remarkable 719 per 100,000 in Antioquia, mostly 
because of violence in Medellin, and was 272 overall in the non-growing region. These statistics are per 
100,000, among men aged 15-59.  Without the big-city departments, homicide rates in the non-growing 
region averaged 141 per 100,000.  This can be compared to the rates of 87 in the 9-department growing 
region without the DMZ, 151 in the medium producers, and 205 in the DMZ.  Thus, omission of big-city 
departments makes homicide rates somewhat more comparable across regions. 
 
Potential Confounding Factors 
A potential complication for our analysis is the fact that many growing departments became 
centers of insurgent activity, perhaps for reasons unrelated to the expansion of the coca industry.  At the 
beginning of the decade, however, fewer growing departments were guerilla strongholds.  This can be 
seen in the 1990 distribution of homicides by department (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2001, p. 24).  
Although homicide is not synonymous with a guerrilla presence, a link is widely drawn (e.g., Cardenas, 
2001; Rangel, 2000).
13 In an attempt to separate coca-induced effects, including those related to insurgent 
activity, from the direct effect of a strong guerilla presence, we estimate models with separate effects for 
the DMZ, where the FARC presence is likely strongest, and for the rest of the growing region.   
Another relevant consideration in the Colombian context is the large number of economic 
migrants who move to rural areas in search of work (e.g., in the coca fields) and especially the flow of 
refugees out of the countryside as a consequence of the civil conflict (“poblacion desplazada”).   Both 
types of migration may induce selection bias in an analysis of economic circumstances in rural areas with 
                                                 
13 A study by the Federal Research Division (1988) of the Library of Congress identifies guerilla strongholds in 
1988 as falling in the departments of Huila, Caqueta, Tolima, Cauca, Boyaca, Santander, Antioquia, Valle del 
Cauca, Meta, Cundinamarca and Arauca.  Of these, we classify Huila, Tolima, Boyaca, Santander, Antioquia, Valle 
de Cauca, Cundinamarca, and Arauca as non-growing, Cauca as growing, and Caqueta and Meta as growing, DMZ. 
See also Figure 4.2 in Rabas and Chalk (2001), which shows the strongest FARC presence in and around the DMZ 
in 1986-87, though areas of FARC activity subsequently expanded to cover most of the country (Figure 4.3).  
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many in- and/or out-migrants.  As a partial check on the first issue, we report results from samples with 
and without migrants. It is also worth noting that much displacement occurs within departments, and that, 
according to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2002), the largest senders and 
receivers of displaced populations include both growing and non-growing departments under our 
classification scheme, while the phenomenon of internal displacement long pre-dates the rise in coca 
production.  In fact, a specification check which looks for growing-region/year interactions of the sort that 
might confound our analysis shows no growing/post-1995 effect on the probability of being a migrant. 
 
IV. The Economic Consequences of a Coca Economy 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section uses differences-in-differences type regressions to assess the economic consequences 
of the shift in coca production to Colombian growing regions.  The data come from the rural component 
of Colombia’s annual household survey and are described in the Appendix.  The rural survey provides 
large repeated cross-sections, with information on households and individual household members, 
including children.  We limit the analysis to data from 1992 (because of earlier changes in survey design) 
through 2000 (after which the survey was replaced by a new panel data set).  The survey was conducted 
in 23 of Colombia’s 33 departments.
14 Using the 14-department definition of the growing region, the rural 
survey includes households from 7 growing departments plus the two DMZ departments.  Because only 3 
non-DMZ departments from the 9-department growing region were included in the rural survey, we focus 
initially on the 14-department classification scheme. 
  Our analysis looks separately at samples of adults, school-age children, and teenage boys who 
might be in the labor market.  The sample of adults includes men and women aged 21-59, and is 
described in the first two columns of Table 3 using data for 1992 and 1997.  Roughly 30% of respondents 
                                                 
14 The included growing departments are Bolivar, Cauca, Narino in the 9-department region, plus Cesar, La Guajira, 
Magdalena, and Norte de Santander, plus Caqueta and Meta in the DMZ.  In contrast with the mortality analysis, 




in this sample were migrants, where migrants are defined as individuals who do not currently live in the 
county where they were born.  Most were married and about half are male.  The growing region 
contributed from 24 percent of the sample in 1992 to 30 percent of the sample in 1997.  The number of 
respondents from the DMZ also increased, from 1.4 to 3.9 percent.  Not surprisingly, few of the adults 
were enrolled in school. 
About two-thirds of adults in the survey were employed in 1992 and 1997, though only about 36 
percent had positive wage and salary earnings.  Employment rates for men were 93-95 percent, as can be 
seen in Columns (3) and (4), and 55 percent of men had positive wage and salary earnings.  Between 25 
and 26 percent of adult men and women had positive income from self-employment, while between 35 
and 37 percent of adult men had positive income from self-employment.  Self-employment income 
includes income from individual short-term contracts, from the sale of domestically produced goods, and 
from commercial or family-based agricultural production.  Wage and salary earnings and self-
employment income are reported in real terms and were constructed using the consumer price index 
provided by the Department of National Statistics (DANE).  These variables are given in 1998 pesos, 
worth about 1,400 to the US dollar.  Thus, mean wages range from 52 to 77 dollars per month, and mean 
self-employment income from 241 to 398 dollars per year, in the sample of adults. 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of children, reported in Columns (5)-(8), show that most were 
enrolled, and enrollment rates increased somewhat between 1992 and 1997.  Fewer children than adults 
were migrants, but the regional distribution of children was broadly similar to that for adults.   
Employment statistics for children are only collected for those over 10 years of age.  About a third of 
boys aged 10-16 and 10 percent of girls aged 10-16 were working, indicating the importance of child 
labor.  The statistics in Columns (9) and (10) show that over half of boys aged 13-20 were working.  
Hours per month for boys were substantial, though lower than for adults.  Boys also had lower earnings.  
The wage and salary income of boys ranges from 42-44 dollars per month, and boys’ self-employment 




Results for Adults 
The basic empirical framework looks for growing-region/post-air-bridge interactions while 
controlling for department and year effects.  In particular, we estimated year-region interaction terms 
using the following model for respondent i in department j in year t: 
yijt = Xi′µ + βj + δt + Gs α0sgjs + Gs α1sdjs + εijt,  (1) 
where βj is a department effect, δt is a year effect, gjs indicates non-DMZ growing departments when t=s, 
and djs indicates DMZ departments when t=s (s=1994, . . ., 2000). The parameters α0s and α1s are the 
corresponding region-type/year interaction terms.  Some models also include linear trends for each 
department type as a control for omitted variables and serial correlation.  This amounts to replacing βj 
with β0j + β1jt, where β1j takes on 3 values (non-growing, growing, and DMZ).  The estimating equations 
also control for a vector of individual covariates, Xi, which includes sex, age dummies, household size, 
marital status and migrant status.  For binary dependent variables, the linear model was replaced with the 
analogous logit. 
The analysis of rural outcomes begins with estimates of effects on the probability of having self-
employment income and on the log of self-employment income for those who have some.  Because coca 
production is an agricultural activity, self-employment status (either as farmer, employer, landowner, or 
contractor) is of special interest.  The interpretation of results for log self-employment income is 
potentially complicated by selection bias from conditioning on having earnings in this sector.  As in a 
wage equation, however, we can make an educated guess as to the likely sign of any selection bias.  Since 
the presumptive effect of being in the growing region after 1994 is to increase the likelihood of self-
employment, the conditional-on-positive estimates of effects on log wages will typically be biased 
downwards by the fact that, on the margin, those induced to enter self-employment have lower self-
employment earnings potential in the absence of treatment (see, e.g., Angrist, 2001). 
The first two columns of Table 4a report marginal effects from the logit version of equation (1), 
with a dummy for self-employment status on the left-hand side.  The sample includes women as well as 
men because women have a reasonably high probability of having self-employment income.  The  
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estimates in Column (1) are small, with positive but insignificant effects in 1996-97 and 1999-00.  We 
also report results without migrants as a partial control for potential selection biases from migration into 
and out of growing regions.  Results omitting migrants, reported in Column (2), are somewhat larger, 
showing a marginally significant positive effect in 1996 (0.049, with an s.e. of 0.03) and a significant 
effect of 0.052 in 2000 (s.e.=0.022).
15  
In contrast with the small-to-zero estimates for self-employment probabilities, the estimates in 
Columns (3) and (4) show a substantial increase in (log) self-employment income.  In particular, there are 
large, statistically significant effects on the order of 0.3-0.4 in 1996-98, a period when coca is likely to 
have had a major impact.  For example, the effect in 1996 in the sample including migrants is 0.362 
(s.e.=0.131).  There are somewhat smaller positive effects in 1995 and 1999-2000, the former not 
significantly different from zero and some of the latter marginally significant. 
In an effort to improve precision, we also estimated models with pooled region-year interaction 
terms.  These models can be written 
yijt = Xi′µ + βj + δt  
+ α0,95-97gj,95-97 + α0,98-00gj,98-00 + α1,95-97dj,95-97 + α1,98-00dj,98-00 + εijt, (2) 
where Xi is the vector of individual characteristics referred to above, with coefficient vector µ.  The 
interaction dummies gj,95-97 and gj,98-00 indicate the non-DMZ growing region for t=1995-97 and t=1998-
2000, with corresponding interaction terms α0,95-97 and α0,98-00.  Likewise, the interaction dummies dj,95-97 
and dj,98-00 indicate the DMZ in 1995-97 and 1998-2000, with corresponding interaction terms α1,95-97 and  
α1,98-00.  As before, with binary dependent variables the reported results are logit marginal effects.  Also, 
as with equation (1), we estimated versions of (2) replacing βj with β0j + β1jt, where β0j is a department 
fixed effect and β1j is a trend taking on 3 values, one for each department type.  
Self-employment results from models with pooled interaction terms and omitting trends are 
reported in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4b.  These models generate statistically significant estimates of 
                                                 
15 Standard errors were adjusted for random/group effects at the department-year level.  Rural estimates with 
department-only clustering are similar.  Because there are relatively few clusters (departments) we prefer the 
department-year clustering scheme.    
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effects on the probability of self-employment and on the log of self-employment income in the non-DMZ 
growing region.  The former effects are small, on the order of 3-4 percentage points, but the latter are 
large (see, e.g., the Column (3) estimate of 0.25 in 1995-97 with a standard error of 0.1).  Moreover, the 
absence of substantial effects on the probability of having self-employment income suggests selection 
bias from changes in labor force participation is not much of a concern in this context. 
Estimates of interactions for the DMZ show no effect on the probability of having self-
employment income, but even larger (though imprecisely estimated) effects on log self-employment 
income than in the non-DMZ region.  Again, these results may be subject to selection bias as a result of 
migration, especially in the DMZ, though we include a migrant dummy as a partial control.  At the same 
time, as pointed out above, we found no evidence of selection bias due to migration in a regression of the 
probability of being a migrant on a growing/post-1995 interaction. 
The evidence for an effect of the coca boom on the probability of self-employment is weakened 
considerably by the inclusion of region-specific trends.  For example, the estimates reported in Column 
(2) of Table 4a are either zero or negative.  On the other hand, the 1995-97 effect on the log of self-
employment income, estimated in a model with region-specific trends, is about the same as when 
estimated without trends (compare 0.288 and 0.251) and close to significant at the 0.1 level (t=1.47).  
Moreover, the trend itself is not significantly different from zero. 
The remaining estimates in Tables 4a and 4b are for effects on labor supply measures and the log 
of monthly wages in a sample of men.  We focus on men because male participation rates are 
considerably higher than female participation rates, especially in the wage sector.  The estimated 
employment effects for men show little evidence of a change in participation in the growing region.  Most 
of the estimated interaction terms are small and none are significantly different from zero.  There is some 
evidence of an increase in log hours, though it is not very robust.  For example, in the hours equation, the 
1996 interaction without migrants is 0.048 (s.e.=0.033) and the 1998 interaction with migrants is 0.053 
(s.e.=0.02).  In models with pooled interactions, there is stronger evidence for a significant effect in 1998-
2000 than in 1995-97, though again the estimates are muddied by inclusion of region-specific trends.   
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The estimates for the log wage outcome also show evidence of some effects in 1998-2000, though 
not in 1995-97.  In particular, the strongest effects on wages are in 1998 and 1999.  For example, yearly 
interactions in models with and without migrants are a significant 10-11 percent in 1998 and a significant 
7 percent in 1999.  The increase in relative wages in the growing region in 1998 and 1999 is noteworthy 
given the high levels of violence in the same period.  Effects in the later period but not the earlier may be 
indicative of a delayed spillover from the coca boom, but they may also reflect the continuation of some 
other regional trend.   The fact that the log wage effects for 1998-99 disappear in models with region-
specific trends (see Column (10) in Table 4b) points to the latter possibility. 
 
Results for Children and Youth 
We might expect the increase in coca production to have reduced school enrollment and to have 
generated an increase in child labor.
16  Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5a indeed show statistically 
significant reductions of 0.065 and 0.073 in boys’ school enrollment in 1997, but estimates for other years 
are smaller, and none of the corresponding estimates in pooled models, with or without trends, are 
significant (see Table 5b).  Moreover, while the estimated interaction terms without trends are all 
negative, inclusion of trends causes the signs to flip for boys.  Estimates for girls are mainly positive, 
though not significant.  An exception is the DMZ, where effects are negative and marginally significant 
without trends.
17 
While there appears to have been little impact on school enrollment, the pattern of estimates for 
teen boys’ labor supply is more complex.  For the non-DMZ growing region, the one-year employment 
effect in 1997 and the pooled later-period employment effect are positive.  On the other hand, the pooled 
interaction term for the later period is negative and significant for the DMZ, a result that is also robust to 
the inclusion of trends (though these negative effects become implausibly large).  The pooled non-DMZ 
                                                 
16 Edmunds and Pavcnik (2004) recently explore the link between trade flows and child labor.  Following their 
taxonomy, coca can be seen as an unskilled-labor intensive good that is a candidate for production with child labor. 
17 To adjust inference for within-household clustering, estimates for children and youth were averaged up to the 
household level.  For details, see the Appendix.  
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growing effects are also negative (though insignificant) when estimated in models with trends.  Hence, 
there is no robust evidence of an increase in boys’ employment rates. 
Results for log hours are more clear-cut.  In models without trends, log hours appear to have 
increased in both the non-DMZ growing region and the DMZ.  For example, the pooled estimate for the 
earlier period for the non-DMZ area is 0.112 (s.e.=0.048) and many of the yearly interactions in Table 5a 
are significant.  Inclusion of trends wipes out the DMZ effect but leaves the non-DMZ effects essentially 
unchanged, though no longer significant.  Again, however, the trend in the non-DMZ growing region is 
zero (-0.0016, s.e.=0.022).  On balance, therefore, Table 5b provides support for the notion that coca 
production increased teen boys’ labor supply, at least in the growing departments outside of the DMZ. 
 
Estimates Using Urban Controls and Without Medium Producers  
  Although estimates of equations (1) and (2) point to effects on self-employment income for adults 
and effects on hours worked by teenage boys, these results are made less precise by the inclusion of 
region-specific trends.  In an effort to increase precision and further check the robustness of these 
findings, we tried a pooled analysis that stacks urban with rural data for the subset of departments 
included in both surveys.
18  The idea here is to check whether growing region/post-air-bridge interaction 
effects are indeed larger in rural than urban parts of growing departments, since we expect income shocks 
generated by coca to be larger in the countryside.  An urban-rural stack also facilitates control for region-
specific trends, assuming these have similar effects in urban and rural areas.  A second modification 
explored in this context is to drop the 5 medium producer departments from the list of 14 growing 
regions.  In the spirit of Black, Daniel, and Sander’s (2002) analysis of coal-producing counties according 
to the level of baseline production, this may sharpen the growing/non-growing contrast. 
  The estimating equation for the stacked sample allows for urban main effects and urban 
interactions with both region-type and period dummies in a pooled model similar to the one used to 
                                                 
18 The urban household survey is distinct from the rural survey and has somewhat different geographic coverage and 
variable definitions.  For details, see the Appendix.    
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construct the estimates reported in Table 4b. The coefficients of interest are growing-region/post-
treatment interaction terms, which are allowed to differ by urban-rural status.  Because one of the DMZ 
departments is missing from the urban survey, we drop the other DMZ department as well and look at 
interactions for the non-DMZ growing region only.  Finally, these models control for region-specific 
trends, which are assumed to be the same in both the rural and urban areas of a given department type.  
The addition of urban data potentially allows us to estimate these trends more precisely.  The stacked 
analysis is limited to the subset of adult and children outcomes of primary interest and/or for which their 
appeared to be some evidence of effects in Tables 4 and 5. 
  Estimates from the urban/rural stack for adult self-employment outcomes, reported in Columns 
(1)-(4) of Table 6, are similar to those generated using rural data.  Again, there is no evidence of an 
increased likelihood of self-employment in cities or the countryside (in fact there is a negative effect for 
1998-2000 in urban areas).  At the same time, however, the stacked results show a sharp increase in log 
self-employment earnings for rural workers; in Column (3), for example, the effect is 0.29 (s.e.=0.16) in 
1995-97.  In contrast, the corresponding urban effect is an insignificant 0.16 (s.e.=0.13).  The interaction 
terms in Column (3) for the 1998-2000 period similarly show larger effects in rural than urban areas.  
Estimates of effects on log self-employment income using a sample without medium producers are 
slightly larger than in the full sample, but otherwise similar. 
  In contrast with the self-employment results, the estimated effects on hours worked are more 
mixed.  Estimates with medium producers included, reported in Column (5), show no significant rural or 
urban effects.  On the other hand, dropping the medium producers leads to significant rural and urban 
effects.  The rural effect is larger but not significantly different from that in urban areas, so if the urban 
effect is taken as a check for confounding factors this would point to an interpretation of no effect on 
adult hours in rural areas.  At the same time, Columns (7)-(8) show no effect on wage and salary earnings 
in either urban or rural locations. 
  A clearer picture emerges from the analysis of hours worked by teen boys.  These results, 
reported in Columns (9)-(10) of Table 6, show mostly significant effects with or without medium  
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producers. The results for teen boys also generate a significant contrast by urban-rural status.  In 
particular, there are substantial increases in hours worked by rural teen boys, with no corresponding effect 
on teen boys in urban areas.   For example, the effect on hours worked in 1995-97 is 0.12 (s.e.=0.07) in 
rural areas, but -0.01 (s.e.=0.02) in urban areas.  Finally, we note that estimates for employment status 
corresponding to those in Table 4b show no effects on either adult men or teen boys. 
 
Discussion of Magnitudes 
  The results in Table 6 provide consistent evidence of an increase in self-employment income and 
hours worked by teen boys in the rural parts of coca-growing departments.  To get a sense of whether the 
magnitude of self-employment earnings effects in Columns (3)-(4) of Table 6 can plausibly be attributed 
to a coca boom, we take 0.2 as a benchmark, a number between the rural effect of 0.29 from Column (3) 
and the corresponding difference in urban and rural effects, 0.29−0.16=0.13.  To calibrate, we use Uribe’s 
(1997) description of a typical family coca farm, consisting of a half-hectare plot that generates about 
110,000 pesos/month in revenues from the sale of coca leaf.  Our estimates imply an increase in monthly 
self-employment earnings of about 22,800 pesos at the mean positive self-employment income for self-
employed workers (roughly 114,000 pesos per month).  We do not know how many self-employed 
workers were actually growing coca.  But assuming a quarter of self-employed adults in rural growing 
regions had small coca plots, an aggregate increase of 20% in self-employment earnings could have been 
generated by a 40% increase in output among existing producers jointly with a 40% increase in prices.  
This is obviously just a rough guess.  The point is that the magnitude of the price increase and the 
earnings from coca at baseline are very likely large enough to sustain the kind of impact suggested by our 
estimates. 
 
V. Coca and Violence  
The estimates in the previous section suggest some localized benefits from the coca boom.  The 
benefits are largely those that might be expected to accrue to farmers or others involved in the coca  
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industry, including a marginal labor force of teenage boys.  There is little evidence of wider spillovers.  In 
this section we turn to an analysis of coca effects on violence, as captured by changing homicide rates. 
 
Graphical Analysis 
The evolution of violent death rates in the 1990s is described in Figure 4a, which plots death rates 
per 100,000 for men aged 15-59 by region type, after removing group means.  This figure pools the DMZ 
with other growing departments defined using the 14-department scheme.
19  The resulting plot shows a 
remarkably parallel evolution of violent death rates in the growing and non-growing areas through 1993.  
In particular, the growing and non-growing regions both exhibit a similar up-then-down pattern.  But 
death rates in the growing region flattened in 1994, while the decrease in the non-growing region 
accelerated.  Violent death rates increased in both regions after 1995, but the average rate of increase in 
the growing region was much steeper.  In contrast with this parallel-then-divergent pattern in violent 
death rates, death rates from disease fell somewhat more steeply in the growing than in the non-growing 
region from 1990 through 1998, when there was a sharp upturn in the growing region.  The evolution of 
death rates from disease can be seen in Figure 4b.
20 
Figures 5a and 5b draw a similar picture in the context of a 3-region analysis that separates the 
DMZ from other growing departments.  Here too, violent death rates in the non-DMZ growing region 
flatten in 1994 after an up-then-down pattern paralleling that in the non-growing region.  The main 
difference between this picture and that in Figure 4a is that violent death rates in the DMZ continued to 
                                                 
19 The non-growing region omits Antioquia, Valle de Cauca and Bogota, the departments with Colombia’s three 
largest cities.  Deaths rates were coded from vital statistics micro data obtained from the Colombian statistical 
agency, DANE.  Violent deaths are defined here as homicides, suicides, deaths from military and insurgent activity 
(not a distinct category in all years), and a small number of non-accident deaths by external causes not elsewhere 
classified.  Over 90% of violent deaths are homicides.  For additional details see the data Appendix. 
20 Competing risks complicate the interpretation of the decline in disease death rates since some of those who die by 
violence may have otherwise died of disease.  Still, it seems likely that an environment of deteriorating public health 
would turn up in higher disease death rates (a pattern observed in the DMZ after the government ceded control).  
The competing risks problem is likely mitigated by the fact that those most likely to die from disease (the very old 
and very young) are least likely to die by violence.   As a check on this problem, we looked at infant and child 
mortality by region type.  These data also show relative improvement in the growing region until 1998.  In a related 
inquiry, Urdinola (2003) reports results of a regression of infant mortality rates on measures of violence.  It should 
be noted, however, that changes in definitions make the data on infant deaths in the later period hard to interpret.  
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fall through 1995, after which they increased sharply until a 1998 peak.  In contrast with the acceleration 
in violent death rates, death rates from disease improved steadily in the growing region relative to the 
non-growing region beginning in 1992.  Death rates from disease in the DMZ also tracked rates in the 
non-growing region until 1998. 
A possible complication in the analysis of death rates is the quality of the population statistics 
used for the denominator.  We used census-based 5-year estimates and population projections published 
by DANE (1998) for 1990, 1995, and 2000, linearly interpolating statistics for the in-between years.  The 
underlying census was conducted in 1993.  As noted above, however, the 1990s were marked by 
considerable population movement so the population denominator may be inaccurate.  An alternative 
strategy which avoids this problem is to look at violent death rates relative to death rates from other 
causes.  After transformation to log odds, this approach can be motivated by a multinomial logit model 
for the risk death by cause, where survival is the reference group. 
To describe the logit strategy more formally, let vjt denote the number of violent deaths in 
department j and year t and let njt denote the number of deaths from all other causes.  Let pjt denote the 
corresponding population statistics.  Write the probability of violent and non-violent death as  
vjt/pjt ≡exp(αjt(v)) / [1 + exp(αjt(v) + exp(αjt(n)], 
njt/pjt ≡exp(αjt(n)) / [1 + exp(αjt(v) + exp(αjt(n)]. 
These are identities that define αjt(v) and αjt(n).  We assume further that αjt(v) can be modeled as an 
additive function of region (%j) and year ()t) effects plus growing-region/year interaction terms induced 
by the shift of coca production to Colombia, while αjt(n) has additive effects only.  Then non-zero 
estimates of the interaction terms B0s and B1s in the grouped-logit equation  
ln(vjt/njt) ≡ αjt(v) ─ αjt(n) = %j + )t + Σs B0sgjs + Σs B1sdjs + <jt  
provide evidence of a region-specific shock that increased the risk of violent death. 
This strategy is illustrated in Figure 6, which plots the residual from a regression of ln(vjt/njt) on 
region effects (i.e., deviations from group means) using the 14-department classification scheme,  
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separating the DMZ from other growing departments as in Figure 5.  The logit plot shows the same initial 
pattern of up-then-down log-odds of violent death in both growing and non-growing regions, with a more 
stable then increasing pattern of log-odds of violent death in the growing region after 1993.  This is 
roughly similar to the pattern exhibited by log death rates in Figure 5a.  The log-odds of violent death in 
the DMZ also turned sharply upwards in 1995. 
On balance, the figures suggest that beginning sometime between 1994 and 1996, violent death 
rates in the non-DMZ growing region became markedly higher than what should have been expected 
based on pre-1994 trends.  The pattern is broadly similar in the DMZ, where the FARC presence was 
strongest.  Moreover, the increase in violent death rates contrasts with a gradually improving disease 
environment in this period, both nationwide, and in the growing relative to the non-growing region.  The 
contrast in trends for violence and disease mortality weighs against the notion of a secular deterioration in 
infrastructure or social systems that caused the increase in violence.   
 
Regression Estimates 
To quantify the relative increase in violent death rates in the growing region, we estimated 
growing-region/year interaction terms using the following equation: 
ln(vajt/pajt) = µa + βj + δt + Σs α0sgjs + Σs α1sdjs + εajt. (3) 
The dependent variable, ln(vajt/pajt), is the log death rate in cells defined by 10-year age groups (indexed 
by a), department (indexed by j), and year (indexed by t).  The term µa is an age effect, while other 
parameters are defined as in equation (1).  Also, as with the analysis in the previous section, some models 
include trends for each department type.
21 
Unweighted estimates of α0s and α1s are reported in Panel A of Table 7, while population-
weighted estimates are shown in Panel B.  Given the complete representation of departments in 
                                                 
21 For purposes of estimation, the sample was expanded slightly to include ages 15-64 to accommodate the 10-year 
age groups.  Data are analyzed for age-specific cells to control for changes in the age distribution due to migration 
and because mortality trends tend to be age-specific.   Standard errors were adjusted for department/year clustering, 




population vital statistics, we report equally extensive sets of results with and without medium producers, 
but omit the analysis with pooled interactions.  The unweighted estimates of α0s in Column (1) show an 
insignificant 12.3 percent increase in mortality in 1994 in the non-DMZ growing region, with no effect in 
1993 (a specification check).  The unweighted growing-region effect increases and is significantly 
different from zero by 1997, while the DMZ effect is significant from 1996-1999.  Weighting tends to 
increase precision, so that the weighted estimate of the growing-region effect is significant in 1995.  
Omission of medium producers leads to larger and more significant effects.  These results are reported in 
Columns (5)-(8); for example, Column (5) shows significant 1995 growing region effects around 0.2 in 
both weighted and unweighted specifications.
22  
Inclusion of region-specific trends leads to less precise estimates, though the weighted estimates 
are markedly larger when estimated with trends than without.  None of the estimates using the 14-
department classification are significant when estimated with trends.  On the other hand, weighted models 
with trends generate significant effects as early as 1994 when estimated without medium producers.   
These estimates are reported in Column (7). 
The link between coca production and increased death rates may arise through a number of 
channels, some related to the fact that coca production is an illegal industry.  In particular, those involved 
in the production of coca require private protection, sometimes involving violence and intimidation.   
Moreover, as we noted at the outset, coca is widely believed to provide sources of revenue for guerilla 
and paramilitary groups in rural areas, either through taxation, protection rackets, or direct control of 
production.   In contrast, most of the violence associated with the cocaine trade occurred in large cities 
(most dramatically, in Medellin).  Violence that arises through increased insurgent activity should 
therefore be a bigger problem in the countryside than in cities.  To substantiate this, we estimated growing 
region effects on violent death rates separately for urban and rural victims.
23 
                                                 
22 DMZ effects are (by construction) identical with and without medium producers since the medium producers are a 
subset of the non-DMZ growing region. 
23 DANE mortality files identify the type of area in which the deceased lived and the location of death.  We defined 
urban/rural status by type of residence since hospitals where victims may die are mostly found in cities.  For the 
purposes of our analysis, the deceased was identified as urban when residence was coded as “cabecera municipal.”   
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For the most part, estimates by urban/rural status indeed point to a stronger link between coca 
penetration and violent death rates in rural than urban areas.  This is documented in Table 8, which 
reports estimates of equation (3) for rural residents in Panel A and for urban residents in Panel B.
24  For 
example, the rural estimates of α0s in Column (1) are 0.31 (s.e.=0.17) for 1995, 0.36 (s.e.=0.16) for 1996, 
and 0.4 (s.e.=0.17) for 1997.  The corresponding estimates for urban deaths, reported in Column (5), are 
0.05, 0.17, and 0.11 (s.e.=0.11), none of which are significant.  Overall, the contrast between Columns 
(1)-(2) in Panels A and B shows much larger effects in rural than urban areas.  This pattern also persists in 
models that include trends (results reported in Columns (3) and (4)), with some of the effects on rural 
areas very large and significant (and the corresponding trends large and negative). 
The contrast in results by urban/rural status using a sample that omits medium producers, 
reported in Columns (5)-(8) of Table 8, is less clear-cut than the contrast arising from estimates 
constructed using all 14 growing departments.  On one hand, some of the estimates of α0s without region-
specific trends are slightly larger in urban than rural areas.  On the other, until 1999, after the DMZ was 
ceded, the DMZ interaction terms are larger and more likely to be significant in rural than in urban areas.  
Moreover, estimates of models with trends also show much larger effects in rural than in urban areas (see 
Columns (7) and (8)).  Again, all urban-area effects estimated in models with trends are insignificant.  On 
balance, therefore, we see Table 8 as generally supporting the notion of larger growing-region effects on 
rural than urban violence. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
The disruption of the Andean air bridge provides a unique opportunity to assess the impact of 
increased coca production on Colombia’s rural population and to draw some wider lessons on the link 
between economic conditions and violence.  On the economic side, we find evidence of an increase in 
                                                                                                                                                             
The urban residence variable is available only from 1992. 
24 The urban/rural distinction is used for the numerator but ignored in the population denominator.  Since the model 
is in logs, this probably provides a reasonable approximation to an analysis of true death rates by urban/rural status.  
Estimates in Table 8 are unweighted since we do not have departmental population estimates by urban/rural status 




self-employment income, though not in the likelihood of having income from this source, in the 
probability of working more generally, or in wage and salary earnings.  The increase in self-employment 
income is estimated to be on the order of 13-29 log points, a fairly substantial gain.  There is also some 
evidence for an effect on boys’ labor supply.  Because the gains appear to be fairly concentrated, it seems 
unlikely that increased coca production raised overall standards of living in growing areas.  The absence 
of wider gains may be due to the fact that coca has few links with other sectors or to extortion on the part 
of insurgents and paramilitary forces and the fact that coca finances a conflict that reduces economic 
activity outside of the coca sector.
25  Consistent with this latter view, our results show sharply increased 
violent death rates in growing areas.   
Although we cannot conclusively identify specific channels through which coca abets violence, 
differences in effects by urban/rural status are also consistent with the notion that coca supports rural 
insurgents and paramilitary forces, thereby sustaining Colombia’s civil conflict.  Violence may also be 
used to enforce contracts in this illegal industry, though here the case for an urban/rural differential is less 
clear-cut.  Remarkably, the increase in rural violence occurred against a backdrop of generally improving 
public health as measured by death rates from disease.  
Our results provide an interesting case study of a situation where increases in income did not lead 
to a reduction in civil conflict, but rather fueled the fires of unrest.  This contrasts with the more 
optimistic picture in Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), but is in line with journalistic accounts of 
the role played by blood diamonds in Africa’s civil wars and economic theories of insurrection as 
extraction or extortion (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Grossman, 1991).  Coca may indeed be 
emblematic of a new resource curse.  Finally, we note that the disruption of the Andean air bridge was not 
the end of the aerial drug war.  A recent account describes significant successes in the ongoing effort by 
US and Colombian forces to eradicate Colombia’s coca crops by aerial spraying, and the continued 
suppression of coca production in Peru (Marquis and Forero, 2004).  At the same time, Bolivian 
production is estimated to have increased 17 percent.   
                                                 




Colombian Rural Household Surveys 
The analysis here uses the “Encuesta Rural de Hogares”, the rural component of the “Encuesta Nacional 
de Hogares,” which became “Encuesta Continua de Hogares” (a panel) in 2001.   The rural household 
survey was first conducted as a pilot in 1988.  The survey was conducted again in December 1991 after 
the sampling methodology was updated and then on a consistent basis every September starting in 1992 
until 2000.  The survey collects data on a representative sample from 23 departments in four rural regions: 
Atlantic Region (which includes the departments Atlantico, Cordoba, Magdalena, Sucre, Cesar, La 
Guajira, and Bolivar); Pacific Region (which includes the  departments of Choco, Nariño, Cauca, and 
Valle del Cauca); the Central Region (which includes the departments of Antioquia, Caldas, Huila, 
Tolima, Quindío, Risaralda, and Caqueta); and the Eastern Region (which includes the departments of 




The survey uses the following criteria to identify the rural population.  The rural population includes: 
 
1. The population of the city where the county's government is located if the city has less than 10,000 
inhabitants. 
 
2. The population of the city where the county's government is located if the city has more than 10,000 
inhabitants and it meets one of the following characteristics: 
 
(a)  the percentage of residents in the city does not exceed 50% of the population in the entire county, 
(b) the percentage of the active population engaged in agricultural activities exceeds 50%, or 
(c)  the percentage of housing units without basic services (water, electricity, etc.) exceeds 20%. 
 
3. All population living in towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants. 
 




The sample for the survey is taken from the universe of the Census population living in private 
households.  The sampling methodology consists of first generating strata according to geographical 
location and socioeconomic level; then, randomly drawing ‘municipios’ (the equivalent of counties in the 
U.S.) from these strata; next, randomly drawing neighborhoods from these ‘municipios’; and, finally, 
randomly drawing blocks and then households from these neighborhoods. To facilitate the collection of 
information, households are grouped into ‘segments’ of 10 households on average.  The typical year 
includes approximately 8,500 households, but the sample has increased over time.  In particular, the 
sample size increased in 1996.  The survey collected data from 148 municipios in 1992-1995, but it 
collected data from 197 municipios in 1996-2000. 
 
In addition, the survey methodology changed as follows in 1996.  First, between 1992 and 1995 the 
sample was drawn from the 1985 Census, while starting in 1996 and until 2000 the sample was drawn 
from the 1993 Census.  Second, starting in 1996, interviewers were required to revisit households, which 






The survey weights include factors of adjustment to account for changes in subsampling and for non-
response.  So, we use the weighted data in our analysis to take account of the 1996 changes.   In 
particular, the weights are estimated as: 
 
W = (1/P) × S × (IS/NS), 
 
where P is the probability of an individual being sampled and S is a weight given to segments.  S equals 1 
unless the number of households within the segment exceeds 10.  The last term is the ratio of the number 
of households actually interviewed within a segment, IS, and the number of households selected for 
interviewing within a segment, NS, so it captures the response rate within a segment. 
 
Since the average number of children per household is around 3, we generate within household averages 
for the children’s data in order to avoid multiple observations per household.  Likewise, since the weights 
are individual weights, we construct household weights by summing up the individual weights for all 
children within the household. 
 
Top-coding and imputation 
 
Labor market information is collected from individuals aged 10 and up.  We impute zeros for the 
employment and hours of 8 and 9 year olds in the descriptive statistics in Table 5.  Hours are collected 
from all employed workers, including salaried and wage workers as well as self-employed workers.   
Wage and salary earnings were collected for all jobs in 1992-1999.  In 2000, wage and salary earnings 
were collected separately for the main job and for secondary jobs, so we exclude 2000 from the wage and 
salary regressions.  Yearly self-employment income is collected separately as earnings from business and 
commercial activities and family-based agricultural production.  In the original data, earnings and self-
employed income were top coded only between 1992 and 1995.  We impose uniform top-coding by 
applying a cap at the 95
th percentile (including zeros) for each year.  In addition, we imputed the mean 
earnings and self-employment income by department and year for all those individuals who reported 
having earnings or self-employed income but did not report an amount. 
 
 
Colombian Urban Household Surveys 
We also use the urban component of the “Encuesta Nacional de Hogares,” from 1992-2000.  Coverage for 
the urban component of the survey is more limited than for the rural survey.  In particular, the urban 
survey excluded the departments of Magdalena, Caqueta and Choco in 1992-1995.  For the urban/rural 
analysis we used the 20 departments which are covered in both surveys in 1992-2000.  Also, because 
Caqueta, one of the two DMZ departments, is not in the urban survey during the initial years, the 
urban/rural analysis omits Meta, the other DMZ department, and relies on specifications with non-DMZ 
growing interaction terms only.  
 
The sampling methodology and sample weights used in the urban component are similar to those used in 
the rural component.  The urban population includes all people not included under the rural definition. 
 
As in the rural component of the survey, wage and salary earnings were collected for all jobs in 1992-
1999, but in 2000 wage and salary earnings were collected separately for the main job and for secondary  
 
30
jobs, so the 2000 data are excluded from the wage and salary regressions.  Yearly self-employment 
income is collected separately as earnings from business and commercial activities and the sale of 
domestically produced goods.  In the urban component of the survey, earnings and self-employed income 
were top coded only between 1992 and 1996, so we apply the same uniform top-coding as used in the 
rural survey by applying a cap at the 95
th percentile (including zeros) for each year.  We also imputed 
mean earnings and self-employment income by department and year for all those individuals who 
reported having earnings or self-employed income but did not report an amount. 
 
Mortality Detail Files 
We obtained mortality detail files from the Colombian national statistical agency, DANE, for 1990-2001.  
These files, the source of published vital statistics (e.g., http://www.dane.gov.co/inf_est/vitales.htm), 
show individual death records, with basic demographic information on the deceased and cause of death.  
The 1990 and 1991 files did not include reliable urban/rural codes and are therefore omitted from the 
sample used to construct Table 8.  The 2001 also had some inconsistencies (the file was provisional) and 
was therefore dropped.      
 
Cause of death 
 
We aggregate detailed causes of death on a consistent basis from year to year into the following larger 
groups: Homicide and suicide, accident and other non-violent trauma, disease, other causes, and other 
violent deaths.  The violent death rate used here is the sum of Homicide and suicide plus other violent 
deaths.  Data after 1997 show separate categories for general external causes not identified as accidents, 
and deaths due to actions by state and guerilla forces.  These two categories appear to correspond to the 




Our construction of death rates by department and year is for department of death and not residence. 
Urban/rural status, however is by area of residence.  This is coded somewhat differently from year to 
year.  We established a consistent urban/rural by coding as urban those listed as living in “cabecera 
municipal” and coding the institutionalized as non-urban.  Those with missing urban/rural status (about 
1/16 of deaths) are omitted from the analysis used to produce Table 8. 
 
Match to population information 
 
As noted in the text, population statistics for each department-year-age(5 year)-sex category were 
obtained from DANE (1998) for 1990, 1995, and 2000.  The Colombian census used for these data was 
conducted in 1993, so data for other years are inter-censal estimates and projections.  We interpolated 
using 5-year growths for each cell.   
 
Finally, we aggregated mortality counts to match 5-year age bands, and then matched to the relevant 
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9 growing dept. Intercept 735 207 506 292
(1,749) (2,112) (2,024) (2,458)
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0.134 0.121 0.108 0.087 0.141 0.107 0.085 0.029
9 growing dept. Intercept 735 207 506 292
(1,845) (4,198) (2074) (4,911)
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(3,883) (4,198) (4,364) (4,911)








control no treated yes control no treated yes
0.140 0.125 0.106 0.091 0.141 0.105 0.079 0.017
TABLE 1. FIRST STAGE FOR COCA CULTIVATION GROWTH
Notes: The table reports estimates of the change in cocaine cultivation on 1994 levels for the 33 Colombia Departments (states). The 1994
variable is the average of 4 measures from Thoumi et al. (1997). The 1999 and 2000 data are police estimates, reported in Government of
Colombia (2002).
B. Without DMZ departments
A. With DMZ departments
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-growing Santafe de Bogota, DC 4,945,448 99.7 60.8 75.2 178.8
Amazonas 37,764 50.4 56.3 33.2 35.3
Antioquia 4,342,347 72.0 75.1 59.1 718.7
Arauca 137,193 63.6 90.0 38.8 226.3
Atlantico 1,667,500 93.7 68.2 67.9 65.2
Boyaca 1,174,031 42.5 65.8 47.4 124.1
Caldas 925,358 64.7 66.2 56.3 251.6
Casanare 158,149 54.7 77.9 34.5 153.1
Choco 338,160 38.5 66.6 32.0 65.6
Cordoba 1,088,087 48.2 89.5 50.5 66.7
Cundinamarca 1,658,698 54.7 71.7 55.3 126.4
Huila 758,013 60.0 73.9 47.7 132.6
Quindio 435,018 83.8 64.7 65.0 173.0
Risaralda 744,974 81.3 66.1 59.1 303.4
San Andres y Providencia 50,094 70.4 69.7 84.2 44.1
Santander 1,598,688 68.9 68.9 53.3 192.7
Sucre 624,463 67.1 96.6 51.3 38.5
Tolima 1,150,080 60.7 71.9 55.5 140.9
Valle del Cauca 3,333,150 85.3 71.9 62.6 311.5
All 19 non-growing 25,167,215 75.5 70.9 59.8 271.6
Non-growing  12,546,270 64.5 72.7 54.0 140.7
(w/o Bogota, Antioquia, and Valle de Cauca)
9-Dept Bolivar 1,439,291 68.6 75.4 50.4 41.1
growing Cauca 979,231 36.7 73.8 36.3 170.0
Guaviare 57,884 36.9 59.3 17.4 130.5
Narino 1,274,708 42.9 62.4 33.7 58.7
Putumayo 204,309 34.6 75.4 28.0 170.7
Vaupes 18,235 24.8 74.9 21.4 2.8
Vichada 36,336 24.1 54.2 16.6 39.3
All 9-dept w/o DMZ 4,009,994 49.8 70.6 39.4 86.5
9-Dept, DMZ Caqueta 311,464 46.0 76.4 31.7 205.2
Meta 561,121 64.0 72.9 52.2 204.7
All DMZ 872,585 57.5 74.3 44.3 204.9
Medium Cesar 729,634 62.9 82.1 50.7 146.2
producers Guainia 13,491 30.4 43.3 17.1 45.3
La Guajira 387,773 64.3 72.5 58.5 135.8
Magdalena 882,571 64.0 67.7 41.0 70.8
Norte de Santander 1,046,577 70.8 67.8 42.4 241.2
All medium producers 3,060,046 66.0 71.7 45.6 150.6
All Departments 33,109,840 71.0 71.1 55.2 235.8
Enrollment
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY REGION TYPE
Source: Colombia Estadistica, 1993-1997 and tabulations of vital statistics. Columns (2), (3) - from table 2.1.2. Column (3): % of pop. living in cabecera. Columns (4),
(5) - from tables 10.2.1 and 10.3.1. Column (4): primary enrollment divided by pop. aged 5-9 plus 60% of the pop. aged 10-14. Column (5): secondary enrollment
divided by 40% of the pop. aged 10-14 plus pop. aged 15-19.  Homicide rates are for men aged 15-59, per 100,000.1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Employed 0.658 0.647 0.950 0.931 0.360 0.283 0.095 0.077 0.600 0.506
(0.474) (0.478) (0.219) (0.253) (0.436) (0.413) (0.264) (0.250) (0.450) (0.458)
Hours Worked per month 142.3 131.8 219.3 200.3 65.6 44.9 15.4 11.2 121.2 94.1
(117.3) (115.0) (76.8) (85.2) (86.9) (74.3) (47.8) (39.7) (103.0) (96.6)
Monthly Wages 74,098 81,461 115,439 123,636 61,038 58,921
(115,512) (127,287) (126,002) (137,069) (78,522) (84,989)
Positive Wages 0.362 0.369 0.551 0.555 0.418 0.350
SE Income  (5% top code) 337,712 352,969 557,381 551,260 61,196 65,253
(815,718) (865,459) (1,026,941) (1,048,327) (311,898) (291,899)
Positive SE Income 0.247 0.259 0.348 0.371 0.066 0.080
Enrolled 0.017 0.028 0.014 0.024 0.694 0.779 0.757 0.815 0.397 0.486
Age 36.43 37.02 36.60 37.12 11.91 11.94 11.87 11.90 16.16 16.22
(10.65) (10.62) (10.68) (10.63) (2.10) (2.18) (2.15) (2.19) (1.95) (1.90)
HH Size 5.60 5.32 5.56 5.31 6.60 6.35 6.66 6.41 6.57 6.35
(2.56) (2.49) (2.60) (2.51) (2.36) (2.41) (2.36) (2.43) (2.48) (2.57)
Migrant 0.282 0.316 0.280 0.312 0.133 0.161 0.163 0.160 0.161 0.182
Single 0.229 0.221 0.284 0.277 1.00 0.999 0.990 0.981 0.981 0.970
Male 0.496 0.597
Growing (14-dept) 0.235 0.303 0.234 0.309 0.262 0.332 0.250 0.336 0.238 0.332
Growing (9-depts) 0.137 0.181 0.133 0.180 0.147 0.191 0.138 0.198 0.138 0.197
DMZ 0.014 0.039 0.014 0.039 0.013 0.040 0.014 0.044 0.011 0.034
Max N 13,550 19,184 6,641 9,801 2,602 3,513 2,477 3,253 2,040 2,881
Teenage Workers
 (boys)
Notes: Adult workers include men aged 21-59. Boys and girls are aged 8-16. Labor market outcomes for boys and girls are only reported for those over 10 years of age. Teenage workers are boys aged 13-20. Wages and self-
employment income include zeros and are in real (1998) pesos, about 1,400 to the US dollar.




 (men) Boys GirlsInteraction All w/o Migrants All w/o Migrants All w/o Migrants All w/o Migrants All w/o Migrants
Terms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1994 -0.035 -0.046 -0.025 0.080 -0.014 -0.019 -0.026 -0.031 0.014 0.027
(0.023) (0.024) (0.175) (0.161) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038)
1995 0.009 0.002 0.159 0.190 -0.002 -0.008 0.004 0.006 -0.011 -0.008
(0.024) (0.023) (0.153) (0.155) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.029) (0.037) (0.038)
1996 0.042 0.049 0.362 0.414 0.003 -0.010 0.034 0.048 -0.008 0.002
(0.030) (0.030) (0.131) (0.141) (0.014) (0.015) (0.028) (0.033) (0.041) (0.049)
1997 0.025 0.035 0.270 0.292 -0.005 -0.013 -0.001 0.002 0.010 0.028
(0.020) (0.019) (0.122) (0.116) (0.014) (0.018) (0.030) (0.036) (0.041) (0.046)
1998 -0.020 -0.009 0.302 0.291 0.0004 -0.012 0.053 0.035 0.103 0.107
(0.025) (0.023) (0.162) (0.183) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.056) (0.058)
1999 0.007 0.016 0.205 0.150 0.015 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.069 0.067
(0.022) (0.021) (0.133) (0.136) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.023) (0.038) (0.039)
2000 0.044 0.052 0.255 0.230 -0.003 -0.012 0.065 0.085
(0.023) (0.022) (0.145) (0.155) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
N 147,833 100,284 40,338 28,912 74,781 50,914 69,144 46,770 34,451 22,257
Notes: The table reports growing region/year interactions.  Estimates for monthly wages omit data for 2000.  Standard errors adjusted for department-year clustering are reported in parentheses.
TABLE 4a. ADULT LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES - YEARLY INTERACTIONS, POOLED GROWING & DMZ
Male and Female Workers Men Only
Positive SE Income Log SE Income Employed Log Hours (All Jobs)
Log Monthly Wage and 
Salary EarningsInteraction No Trends w/Trends No Trends w/Trends No Trends w/Trends No Trends w/Trends No Trends w/Trends
Terms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1995-1997 0.039 0.006 0.251 0.288 0.0045 0.0079 0.020 0.013 -0.0051 -0.035
(0.017) (0.031) (0.100) (0.196) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.028) (0.028) (0.052)
1998-2000 0.031 -0.036 0.260 0.333 0.013 0.020 0.044 0.030 0.079 0.026
(0.017) (0.049) (0.106) (0.340) (0.008) (0.029) (0.015) (0.051) (0.034) (0.099)
Trends 0.011 -0.012 -0.0011 0.0024 0.0098
(0.008) (0.053) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016)
1995-1997 0.002 -0.028 0.625 0.383 -0.020 0.058 0.050 0.057 -0.047 -0.067
(0.035) (0.071) (0.299) (0.359) (0.031) (0.052) (0.034) (0.075) (0.050) (0.116)
1998-2000 -0.098 -0.155 0.349 -0.129 -0.039 0.108 0.126 0.138 0.058 0.024
(0.037) (0.133) (0.296) (0.634) (0.030) (0.079) (0.036) (0.127) (0.063) (0.191)
Trends 0.009 0.077 -0.025 -0.002 0.006
(0.021) (0.107) (0.012) (0.020) (0.029)
N
TABLE 4b. ADULT LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES WITH POOLED INTERACTION TERMS
Men Only
Positive SE Income Log SE Income Employed Log Hours (All Jobs)
Log Monthly Wage and 
Salary Earnings
Notes: The table reports pooled growing region/year interactions terms estimated using equation (2) in the text. Estimates for monthly wages omit data for 2000. Standard errors adjusted for department-year
clustering are reported in parentheses.
Male and Female Workers
Panel A: Growing Effects (non-DMZ)
Panel B: DMZ Effects









Terms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1994 -0.0039 -0.042 0.054 0.044 0.021 0.025 -0.028 -0.040
(0.039) (0.044) (0.028) (0.032) (0.055) (0.063) (0.071) (0.089)
1995 -0.011 -0.012 0.061 0.049 -0.037 -0.048 0.069 0.074
(0.037) (0.040) (0.048) (0.046) (0.040) (0.039) (0.078) (0.083)
1996 -0.0055 0.0010 0.025 0.023 0.033 0.034 0.187 0.173
(0.032) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.043) (0.049) (0.071) (0.072)
1997 -0.065 -0.073 0.031 0.025 0.078 0.092 0.081 0.041
(0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.040) (0.033) (0.035) (0.059) (0.065)
1998 -0.020 -0.042 0.036 0.042 0.011 0.0009 0.228 0.243
(0.034) (0.036) (0.048) (0.056) (0.043) (0.051) (0.059) (0.062)
1999 -0.055 -0.052 0.017 0.0094 0.099 0.123 0.180 0.160
(0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.054) (0.061)
2000 -0.054 -0.059 0.034 0.017 0.078 0.072 0.272 0.253
(0.036) (0.040) (0.034) (0.036) (0.050) (0.053) (0.047) (0.053)
N 27,382 22,695 25,771 21,259 22,365 18,319 12,528 10,104
Notes: The table reports growing region/year interactions. Standard errors adjusted for department-year clustering are reported in parentheses.
TABLE 5a. OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN - YEARLY INTERACTIONS, POOLED GROWING & DMZ
Enrollment Labor Market (Teenage Boys)
Boys Girls Employment Log Hours (All Jobs)Interaction No Trends w/Trends No Trends w/Trends No Trends w/Trends No Trends w/Trends
Terms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1995-1997 -0.0099 0.040 0.035 0.024 0.016 -0.087 0.112 0.117
(0.024) (0.046) (0.024) (0.051) (0.030) (0.060) (0.048) (0.089)
1998-2000 -0.028 0.069 0.027 0.0059 0.073 -0.132 0.236 0.246
(0.025) (0.077) (0.027) (0.095) (0.032) (0.096) (0.040) (0.143)
Trends -0.016 0.0035 0.034 -0.0016
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022)
N 27,382 27,382 25,771 25,771 22,365 22,365 12,528 12,528
1995-1997 -0.103 0.174 -0.115 -0.197 -0.032 -0.248 0.238 -0.0041
(0.083) (0.097) (0.069) (0.145) (0.074) (0.196) (0.095) (0.183)
1998-2000 -0.079 0.436 -0.138 -0.293 -0.213 -0.612 0.232 -0.216
(0.085) (0.142) (0.072) (0.223) (0.088) (0.377) (0.093) (0.332)
Trends -0.087 0.025 0.066 0.071
(0.021) (0.030) (0.053) (0.048)
N
Notes: The table reports pooled growing region/year interactions terms estimated using equation (2) in the text. Estimates for monthly wages omit
data for 2000.  Standard errors adjusted for department-year clustering are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Growing Effects (non-DMZ)
Panel B: DMZ Effects
27,382 25,771 22,365 12,528
TABLE 5b. OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN WITH POOLED INTERACTION TERMS
Enrollment Labor Market (Teenage Boys)
Boys Girls Employment Log Hours (All Jobs)Interaction 14 growing no med. prod. 14 growing no med. prod. 14 growing no med. prod. 14 growing no med. prod. 14 growing no med. prod.
Terms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1995-1997 0.006 0.017 0.286 0.328 0.037 0.061 -0.019 -0.024 0.119* 0.122*
(0.032) (0.032) (0.162) (0.175) (0.025) (0.029) (0.058) (0.071) (0.082) (0.078)
1998-2000 -0.031 -0.029 0.295 0.316 0.079 0.127 0.045* 0.022 0.216* 0.210*
(0.047) (0.044) (0.253) (0.304) (0.039) (0.043) (0.095) (0.110) (0.128) (0.129)
1995-1997 0.013 -0.015 0.155 0.186 0.025 0.042 -0.038 -0.060 -0.004 -0.006
(0.027) (0.024) (0.128) (0.146) (0.020) (0.023) (0.057) (0.059) (0.072) (0.181)
1998-2000 -0.019 -0.053 0.174 0.190 0.040 0.079 -0.087 -0.137 -0.047 -0.010
(0.050) (0.042) (0.207) (0.247) (0.033) (0.037) (0.088) (0.094) (0.127) (0.134)
Trend 0.01 0.014 -0.004 -0.021 -0.005 -0.014 0.011 0.016 0.001 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.033) (0.039) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
N 482,053 477,346 116,896 113,831 192,840 189,003 101,779 100,338 22,141 21,084
Log Monthly Wage and 
Salary Earnings
TABLE 6. ADULT AND TEENAGE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES - RURAL AND URBAN EFFECTS
Notes: The table reports results from a stacked urban and rural sample. Estimates for monthly wages omit data for 2000. Standard errors adjusted for department-year clustering are reported in parentheses. '*' denotes a
significant rural-urban difference.  Columns labelled "14 growing" use the same growing region as in Tables 4 and 5.  Columns labelled "no medium producers," drop the 5 medium producing departments from the analysis.
Log Hours
 (All Jobs)
Male and Female Workers Teenage Boys
Panel A: Rural Effects
Panel B: Urban Effects
Men Only
Positive SE Income Log SE Income
Log Hours
 (All Jobs)Growing DMZ Growing DMZ Growing DMZ Growing DMZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1993 0.026 -0.059 0.012 -0.059
(0.118) (0.149) (0.170) (0.149)
1994 0.123 -0.078 0.133 -0.145 0.209 -0.077 0.255 -0.145
(0.120) (0.123) (0.161) (0.192) (0.162) (0.122) (0.222) (0.192)
1995 0.102 0.198 0.118 0.098 0.236 0.198 0.302 0.097
(0.096) (0.165) (0.188) (0.286) (0.131) (0.164) (0.261) (0.285)
1996 0.154 0.266 0.176 0.134 0.289 0.266 0.374 0.132
(0.114) (0.132) (0.241) (0.342) (0.142) (0.132) (0.331) (0.340)
1997 0.230 0.402 0.259 0.237 0.346 0.403 0.451 0.236
(0.132) (0.178) (0.296) (0.434) (0.154) (0.178) (0.402) (0.431)
1998 0.200 0.514 0.235 0.315 0.506 0.514 0.631 0.314
(0.152) (0.170) (0.346) (0.505) (0.197) (0.170) (0.482) (0.501)
1999 0.197 0.340 0.238 0.109 0.259 0.340 0.403 0.107
(0.102) (0.140) (0.383) (0.572) (0.142) (0.140) (0.534) (0.568)
2000 0.289 0.142 0.337 -0.122 0.358 0.142 0.522 -0.124
(0.100) (0.148) (0.432) (0.651) (0.120) (0.147) (0.601) (0.646)
Dept. trend -0.006 0.033 -0.020 0.033
(0.052) (0.079) (0.072) (0.078)
1993 -0.080 -0.100 -0.202 -0.101
(0.109) (0.144) (0.113) (0.145)
1994 0.045 -0.137 0.097 -0.105 0.062 -0.137 0.283 -0.105
(0.095) (0.099) (0.140) (0.167) (0.093) (0.100) (0.137) (0.168)
1995 0.141 0.126 0.205 0.159 0.183 0.125 0.473 0.159
(0.081) (0.135) (0.171) (0.240) (0.103) (0.136) (0.187) (0.241)
1996 0.163 0.178 0.241 0.214 0.180 0.178 0.538 0.214
(0.134) (0.139) (0.239) (0.296) (0.158) (0.140) (0.262) (0.297)
1997 0.179 0.260 0.269 0.298 0.220 0.259 0.647 0.298
(0.115) (0.140) (0.270) (0.353) (0.130) (0.141) (0.293) (0.354)
1998 0.120 0.434 0.222 0.474 0.169 0.434 0.665 0.475
(0.100) (0.146) (0.308) (0.412) (0.110) (0.147) (0.334) (0.414)
1999 0.313 0.296 0.428 0.339 0.369 0.296 0.934 0.339
(0.092) (0.112) (0.350) (0.461) (0.110) (0.113) (0.384) (0.463)
2000 0.388 0.119 0.516 0.163 0.401 0.118 1.034 0.164
(0.097) (0.122) (0.397) (0.524) (0.106) (0.123) (0.433) (0.526)
Dept. trend -0.013 -0.002 -0.069 -0.002
(0.046) (0.062) (0.052) (0.062)
Notes: The table reports results of regressions with log violent death rates on left hand side, controlling for department, year and age effects and
estimated using statistics aggregated by department, year, and 10-year age groups, for men aged 15-64. Standard errors adjusted for department-year
clustering are in parentheses.
B. Weighted
A. Unweighted
TABLE 7. MORTALITY ESTIMATES
14 Growing Departments No Medium Producers
No trends With trends No trends With trendsGrowing DMZ Growing DMZ Growing DMZ Growing DMZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1994 0.038 -0.087 0.644 0.322 0.155 -0.086 0.645 0.321
(0.212) (0.133) (0.462) (0.298) (0.207) (0.137) (0.471) (0.300)
1995 0.310 0.378 1.305 1.057 0.301 0.378 1.111 1.055
(0.170) (0.140) (0.686) (0.498) (0.202) (0.143) (0.705) (0.500)
1996 0.356 0.580 1.740 1.529 0.317 0.580 1.446 1.527
(0.161) (0.202) (0.930) (0.718) (0.186) (0.205) (0.946) (0.721)
1997 0.397 0.283 2.170 1.503 0.301 0.284 1.751 1.501
(0.172) (0.198) (1.18) (0.922) (0.182) (0.200) (1.19) (0.925)
1998 0.266 0.491 2.427 1.981 0.324 0.491 2.094 1.978
(0.176) (0.230) (1.43) (1.13) (0.171) (0.232) (1.44) (1.14)
1999 0.415 0.055 2.965 1.816 0.329 0.056 2.420 1.813
(0.184) (0.186) (1.68) (1.33) (0.221) (0.189) (1.69) (1.34
2000 0.506 -0.019 3.444 2.011 0.299 -0.019 2.709 2.008
(0.205) (0.159) (1.93) (1.54) (0.207) (0.162) (1.94) (1.54)
Dept. trend -0.388 -0.270 -0.320 -0.270
(0.251) (0.210) (0.250) (0.211)
1994 0.196 -0.048 0.147 0.183 0.279 -0.048 0.246 0.183
(0.150) (0.257) (0.295) (0.462) (0.150) (0.257) (0.364) (0.463)
1995 0.052 0.100 -0.030 0.484 0.200 0.099 0.146 0.483
(0.115) (0.158) (0.439) (0.700) (0.138) (0.158) (0.565) (0.672)
1996 0.165 -0.040 0.051 0.498 0.345 -0.041 0.269 0.496
(0.118) (0.209) (0.604) (0.941) (0.147) (0.209) (0.779) (0.944)
1997 0.109 0.146 -0.038 -0.838 0.356 0.146 0.258 0.837
(0.144) (0.189) (0.775) (1.20) (0.166) (0.189) (0.993) (1.20)
1998 0.034 0.332 -0.145 1.177 0.333 0.331 0.213 1.176
(0.145) (0.167) (0.941) (1.46) (0.186) (0.167) (1.21) (1.46)
1999 0.053 0.329 -0.158 1.328 0.217 0.328 0.076 1.326
(0.128) (0.168) (1.11) (1.73) (0.156) (0.168) (1.42) (1.73)
2000 0.080 0.115 -0.164 1.268 0.246 0.115 0.083 1.266
(0.120) (0.189) (1.28) (1.99) (0.153) (0.189) (1.63) (2.00)
Dept. trend 0.033 -0.154 0.022 -0.154
(0.169) (0.266) (0.216) (0.267)
Notes: The table reports unweighted estimates from regressions with log violent death rates on left hand side, controlling for department, year and age
effects. The model is estimated using statistics aggregated by department, year, and 10-year age groups, for men aged 15-64. Standard errors adjusted
for department-year clustering are in parentheses.
B. Urban
A. Rural
TABLE 8. MORTALITY ESTIMATES BY URBAN/RURAL RESIDENCE
14 Growing Departments Without Medium Producers



































































Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO) - IMF 2003




























































Sources given in data appendix.1,000
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Major growing Other growing Non-growing
Fig. 3. Coca Cultivation: 1994-99 growth as a function of 1994 levels 
Notes: Scales are logarithmic. The 100 hectare base group includes 100 or less.



















1. Log rates, relative to average by department type.
2. Non-growing omits Antioquia, Valle, and Bogota DC.

















1. Log rates, relative to average by department type.
2. Non-growing omits Antioquia, Valle, and Bogota DC.











1. Logits, relative to average by department type.
2. Non-growing omits Antioquia, Valle, and Bogota DC.
Fig. 6. Death Rates – Logit(Violence/Total) -- for Men Aged 15 - 59  